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Abstract
This paper presents a new market failure in the decision on educa-
tional type in higher education. Individuals choose types of education
with diﬀerent degrees of specialization. Labor market transformation
makes some individuals opt for a non-specialized education type that
broadens the future career possibilities in an uncertain labor market.
However, the growth rate in the economy is assumed to positively
depend on the amount of specialized workers that get a job within
their specialized ﬁeld. Imposing a tax and transfer scheme in favor
of specialized education types may correct for the market failure and
Pareto improve the economy if the transfer attracts a suﬃciently large
amount of new students to a specialized education type and if their
eﬀect on the growth rate is substantial.
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There is a widespread consensus that a highly educated population is pos-
itive for the economy and for society in general. High-educated workers
face lower unemployment risk, earn higher wages, are presumably better in-
formed and make wiser decisions than low-educated workers. Moreover, a
high-skilled labor force may also foster economic growth through more pro-
ductivity enhancing innovations and a better adoption of new technology; see
Bartel and Lichtenberg (1988) for a review. The magnitude of this growth
externality has been extensively studied by Denison (1984), Schultz (1981),
Psacharopoulos (1973), Becker and Lewis (1992) and Barro (2001). Although
the results in these studies are mixed, recent results seem to indicate that
higher education is more important than what has been shown in earlier
studies; see Gemmell (1997) for a review of the literature.
Despite the acknowledgement of the importance of higher education for
economic growth, surprisingly little attention has been given to the impact
of the distribution of higher education enrollment among diﬀerent types of
education, such as educations to become a lawyer, teacher or engineer. Higher
education has often been treated as a homogenous good, although no one
would think that all high-educated individuals have the same possibility of
aﬀecting the growth rate. Two exceptions where the type of education is
highlighted are Murphy et al. (1991) and Zilibotti and Storesletten (2000).
Both papers emphasize the importance of engineers as a growth-enhancing
education and work type.1
This paper suggests another form of heterogeneity among diﬀerent edu-
cation directions, namely the degree of specialization. This may be of impor-
tance for the extent to which high-educated workers aﬀect economic growth.
The basic idea is simple. The transformation of the labor market makes the
decision of type of education uncertain. This is due to the fact that occupa-
1Alstadsaeter et al. (2005) also distinguish among diﬀerent education types, but their
focus is not the eﬀect on the growth rate, bur rather on the overall unemployment rate.
2tions which are in high demand at the time of the education decision may
be in less demand when the education is ﬁnished and the individuals enter
the labor market, and vice versa. This may cause some individuals to opt
for a broad education type, including diﬀerent subjects, in order to insure
against unemployment or having to take an unskilled job. The broader ed-
ucation may be designed to give a basic knowledge in several areas, thereby
broadening the future career possibilities.
The theory of the division of labor stresses the importance of specialized
workers for increased productivity and thus economic growth; see Lavezzi
(2003) for a historical review. Hence, if growth increases all individuals’
wages, there could be under-investment in specialized education types since
individuals do not take into account the eﬀect of their education decision
on the growth rate. This problem might have been aggravated in the last
decades, keeping in mind the increasing speed of globalization and its conse-
quences for the magnitude of labor market transformation. I present some
support for this hypotheses in the following section, together with a presen-
tation of and support for the theory of division of labor.
In the model, individuals are heterogeneous in their preference for risk.
They all face the same education decision, a specialized education direction
followed by an uncertain labor market, or a broad direction which gives a safe
payoﬀ. If they choose the risky option, they have some exogenous probability
of ending up in high-paid work which suits their specialized education type,
or they are unlucky and get a regular work where their education investment
is not productivity enhancing. The broad option gives a low but safe payoﬀ
of the education investment. Because of the heterogeneous preference for
risk, some individuals will choose the risky alternative and some will opt
for the certain one. The growth rate is assumed to aﬀect all individuals
equally by proportionally entering the wage function.2 Moreover, since the
2This way of modelling is also used in Creedy and Francois (1990) and von Greiﬀ
(2007).
3paper focuses on the importance of specialized workers, only individuals that
choose a specialized education type and work in their specialized ﬁeld aﬀect
the growth rate. The government can impose a proportional tax, which
does not alter the education decisions due to its proportional nature. The
tax ﬁnances a transfer, to which only the individuals who have opted for
an uncertain education type that turns out to be unproductive are entitled.
Thus, the government is able to alter the incentives to the diﬀerent education
directions. I assess in which cases this intervention is Pareto improving, which
will depend on the eﬃciency of the transfer in attracting more risk willing
students, and the magnitude of the positive eﬀect of specialized workers who
get employed in their specialized ﬁelds on the growth rate.
An analogue to the government’s intervention is the portfolio theory and
the trade-oﬀ between stocks and bonds. In this paper, the stocks are repre-
sented by specialized education types and the bonds by the broad education
type. The stocks’ payoﬀ is more variable than that of the bonds, but their
expected payoﬀ is also higher.3 By increasing the share of stocks in the
portfolio, the government increases the total expected payoﬀ and also makes
more use of the externality eﬀect from the amount of stocks in the portfolio.
This is done by increasing the payoﬀ of failing, which could be viewed as de-
creasing the variability of a speciﬁc stock. Hence, the transfer paid to failing
specialists can be viewed as the government imposing an insurance system
in order to beneﬁt more from the growth externality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I present
earlier literature on the two main components of the paper. First, I argue
for the importance of the division of labor and its relation to the choice of
educational type. Second, I present some facts suggesting that the speed
of transformation of the labor market is substantial and may even be faster
today than some decades ago. In Section 3, I present the model with and
without government intervention. In Section 4, I assess the condition for
3See Brealey and Myers (1991) for an introduction to portfolio theory.
4government intervention to be Pareto improving. Section 5 concludes.
2 Earlier literature
2.1 Division of labor and specialized education
The theory of division of labor and economic growth goes as far back as Adam
Smith (1776) in his canonical Wealth of Nations. In short, it emphasizes the
importance of specialized workers for increasing returns in the production
process and thereby economic growth. In a thorough review of the theory in
a historical perspective, Lavezzi (2001, p. 4)) states that according to Smith,
labor productivity ... essentially depends on the division of labor which: a)
improves the dexterity of the worker; b) allows the worker to save the time
necessary to switch among diﬀerent activities; c) puts the worker in the con-
dition of inventing machines and facilitates his job. In modern terms, we see
how Smith had in mind the concepts of learning by doing, (point a)), set-up
costs (point b)), and endogenous technological progress (point c)).
and in the following
...therefore technological advances ... can be considered as consequences of
an increased division of labor among and within ﬁrms, since they proceed at
a certain speed only when (i) some classes of men become exclusively engaged
in producing machines, or (ii) in producing knowledge or (iii) when workers
concentrate on a particular phase of the production process.
For another historical review of the theory, see Lavezzi (2003). Later on,
the validity of these old thoughts has been acknowledged by prominent
economists like Stigler (1951), Romer (1987) and Becker and Murphy (1992),
which all focus on diﬀerent factors that limit specialization, such as the stocks
5of physical and human capital, the costs of coordinating labor and trans-
portation costs. To my knowledge, the link to educational choice has not yet
been explored, however. The degree of specialization in the work force may
naturally depend on more factors than the degree of specialization in work-
ers’ educations. Such things might be on-the-job-training, which could be
focused on specialized skills, and individuals’ skills developed in other ways
than formal education. Nevertheless, it is hard to reject the highly plausible
possibility that the degree of specialization in higher education has a signiﬁ-
cant impact on the degree of specialization of the labor force, as I assume in
this paper.
2.2 Labor market transformation
If there were no labor market transformation, individuals could choose a
specialized education type that they knew ex ante the education decision
would result in a job adequate for the skills learnt during the education.
However, this is usually not the case. Some labor market sectors decrease or
even vanish, while others start up and yet another experiences a boom. The
common view is that ”globalization or technological change has increased the
speed with which economies must adjust. The workforce must be reallocated
between sectors, occupations or geographical regions in order to respond to
changing patterns of demand.” (Greenaway et al. 2000, p. 2).
This view, however, is partly questioned in the same paper. They ﬁnd
that the rate of sectoral transformation in the UK was higher in the 1970s
and 1980s than during the 1950s and 1960s, but that it has then decreased to
the same levels as in the postwar decades. Independent of the change in the
speed of sectoral transformation, there is strong support for the prevalence of
a substantial ongoing sectoral transformation. Moreover, many studies have
found it to be an important factor behind unemployment rate ﬂuctuations;
see, for example, Lilien (1982), Loungani et al. (1990), Brainard and Cutler
(1993) and Mills et al. (1995).
6In this paper, I model the uncertainty of sectoral transformation as if indi-
viduals risk getting a low-paid job if they fail to get a job in their specialized
ﬁeld. Alternatively, there might be a risk for individuals of being unem-
ployed, as suggested by the above evidence. For the purpose of this paper, it
is not important to distinguish between whether individuals opt for a broad
education to insure against a low-paid job or against unemployment.
In many countries, there are many possibilities among which to choose
for a broad education type. For example, a closer look at the applicant
catalogue for universities in Sweden reveals that there are indeed a great
number of education types including several diﬀerent subjects. Moreover,
there are typically very few restrictions on how to combine diﬀerent subjects
into a degree. Therefore, it is common for a degree to include subjects from
completely diﬀerent disciplines.
3 The Model
Consider an economy populated with individuals who are only heterogeneous
in their preference for risk. Their utility function exhibits constant relative





where c is consumption, which is equal to the wage rate since labor supply is
normalized to one for all individuals. A low and a high X indicate low and
high relative risk aversion, respectively. Moreover, X is distributed with a
density function f(X) with support [0,1)4 and the total mass of individuals
4The model can be generalized to include X ≥ 1. However, my choice of the support
of X is made for computational convenience without loss of generality.
7is normalized to unity. All individuals choose between diﬀerent types of
education 5, resulting in diﬀerent wage rates on the labor market There are
N ≥ 2 diﬀerent education subjects and each of them constitutes a type of
education. In addition, there is a broad education type where all N subjects
are included. Hence, in total there are N + 1 diﬀerent education options,
labelled n,n = 1,2,...,N,N + 1. K of the N education types are known to
be labor market sectors that demand labor when the individuals’ educations
are ﬁnished, where 1 ≤ K < N. However, the structural transformation of
the labor market makes it impossible to know ex ante the education decision,
which of these types it will be. Therefore, some individuals may want to
choose the broad education type, that is n = N + 1, in order to insure
against the possibility of not having chosen one of the right subjects. The
reason is that if that happens, the individual’s education has not increased
her productivity in the labor market.
The exogenous probability that a chosen specialization will be demanded
in the labor market is K
N = p for all n = 1,2,...,N. If one of these types is
chosen, c = w(1 + g)k with probability p and c = w(1 + g) with probability
1 − p, where w is some common wage rate in the diﬀerent occupations, g is
the growth rate and k > 1 is a productivity increase due to education. The
broad education type n = N+1 results in a safe income c = w(1+g)k, where
1 < k < k. k > k represents the diﬀerent productivities of the education
types. The safe income is higher than the income of the specialized education
type if it turns out to be the wrong one, but lower than the specialized edu-
cation type if this turns out to be the right one. Let V(S) and V(B) deﬁne
the indirect utility function for the specialized and broad education type, re-
spectively. In sum, choosing n = 1,2,...,N gives the expected indirect utility
5Since the paper focuses on the composition of diﬀerent types of education, the possi-
bility of choosing no education at all is not an option. This is also the case in Alstadsaeter
et al. (2005).









Choosing n = N + 1 gives the expected utility




where the ﬁrst equality follows from the fact that the broad education type
gives a safe payoﬀ. All individuals with E(V (S)) > E(V (B)) choose a spe-
cialized type of education6 and those with E(V (S)) < E(V (B)) choose the
broad education type. Let x represent the threshold level of risk aversion,
that is the indiﬀerent individual. The following equation implicitly deﬁnes x
as a function of k, k and p.
E(V (S)) = V (B)) =⇒ pk
1−x
+ 1 − p = k
1−x (3.4)
The following proposition then ensures an interior solution to the indiﬀerence
equation.
6Since the specialized education types are equally likely to be the right choice and
they give the same wage rate if they are the right choice, it is assumed that the individ-
uals choosing a specialized type of education are evenly spread out among the diﬀerent




k−1 < p <
lnk
lnk. Then there exists x ∈ (0,1) that solves equation (3.4).
Furthermore, the solution is unique.




− 1) − k
1−X + 1). NU for the risk neutral individual,
NU(0) = w(1 + g)(p(k − 1) − k + 1) > 0 by
k−1
k−1 < p. NU for the individual
with highest risk aversion is limX−→1NU(X) = plnk − lnk < 0 by p <
lnk
lnk.
By continuity of NU(X), there exists x such that NU(x) = 0. Second, de-
ﬁne y(X) = p(k
1−X
− 1) − k
1−X + 1. In any case, where NU(x) = 0, it also
holds that y(x) = 0 since the ﬁrst part of the net utility function,
(w(1+g))1−X
1−X ,
is positive for ∀X ∈ [0,1). To show the uniqueness of the interior solution
NU(x) = 0, it suﬃces to show that there is only one x ∈ (0,1) such that
y(x) = 0. First, y is continuous in X and the solution to
∂y
∂X = 0, denoted x,
is unique. Second, y(0) > 0 by assumption and limX−→1
∂y
∂X = lnk−plnk > 0
by assumption. That is, y approaches 0 from below. Hence, y(x) must be
negative. There then exists a unique interior solution x ∈ (0,1) such that
y(x) = 0.￿
The intuition goes as follows. The assumptions in Proposition 1 ensure that
y(0) is positive and that y approaches 0 from below. Since the solution to
the ﬁrst-order condition of y is unique and y is continuous, the function y
must have the form presented in ﬁgure 1 below. Finally, as argued above,
the existence of an interior and unique solution to y implies that there also
exists an interior and unique solution to NU.


















The denominator of equation (3.5) is negative7. It is now possible to evalu-
ate the comparative statics of x with respect to each of the variables. These
results are summarized in Proposition 2.
7To see why, note that by Proposition 1, there exists a unique x ∈ (0,1) and y(0) > 0.
It then follows that
∂y
∂X X=x < 0. This derivative evaluated at X = x is simply the
denominator of equation (3.5).
11Proposition 2
dx
dp > 0, dx
dk > 0 and dx
dk < 0. That is, the number of specialized individuals is
increasing in p and k and decreasing in k.
Proof. Follows from equation (3.5) when evaluating the variables one at a
time.￿
x indicates the risk aversion of the individual who is indiﬀerent between
choosing the safe education type and one of the specialized education types.
Recall that all individuals with X ∈ [0,x] choose a specialized education type
and those with X ∈ (x,1) choose the broad education type. The intuition
behind Proposition 2 is presented in the following.
Note that an increase in p represents either an increase in K and/or a
decrease in N. As p increases, the probability of having luck in a specialized
education type increases, which makes a specialized education type more
attractive. As a result, more individuals opt for a specialized education type
and the indiﬀerent individual is now an individual with a higher risk aversion.
As k increases, the productivity gap between the broad and the specialized
educations decreases, that is k − k −→ 0 as k −→ k. In other words, it
becomes more attractive to choose the broad education type. Hence, the
indiﬀerent individual is now an individual with a lower risk aversion.
As k increases, the productivity gap between the broad education type
and the specialized education types increases. It becomes more attractive to
choose a specialized education type. The indiﬀerent individual is now one
with a higher risk aversion.
3.2 The growth rate g
The economy’s growth rate is decided by the number of individuals that
choose a specialized education type which happens to be successful in the
sense that it leads to a specialized occupation. All specialized individuals
12are assumed to be evenly spread out among the diﬀerent specialized types
of education n = 1,2,...,N, since the expected pay-oﬀ is equal regardless
of which of the specialized education types one chooses. Hence, the number
of successful matches will simply be a pth fraction of the total number of
individuals in specialized education types, which is




0 > 0 (3.6)






0 > 0 (3.7)
where f M = pM.
3.3 Government intervention
As has been shown above, the share of individuals choosing a specialized
education type is not ﬁxed. Rather, it is endogenous and depends on the
incentives of the diﬀerent education options. These incentives might be al-
tered by government intervention, if the government would like to alter the
mass of individuals taking a specialized education type. Since individuals do
not take into account the eﬀect of their education choice on the growth rate,
the laissez-faire equilibrium growth rate could be below the socially optimal
one. In the following, a tax and transfer scheme is introduced.
Let income be taxed by a proportional tax t used to ﬁnance a transfer T >
130 targeted to individuals that choose a specialized education type which turns
out to be wrong, i.e. the individuals with lowest incomes. The deadweight
loss of taxation is represented by a marginal cost of raising public funds
λ(T) ∈ [0,1], λ0 > 0, such that T(1 − λ(T)) is the actual transfer payed.
This cost is introduced because of the non-distortive nature of taxation. In
the absence of this cost, the government would optimally manipulate the
growth rate in an unrealistic way by choosing a T so high that all individuals
would choose a specialized education type. Even though this social optimum
outcome is still possible, the introduction of the cost ensures the possibility of
an interior social optimum. This is the only type of equilibrium considered in
this paper. For the purpose of this paper, it is of no importance whether the
marginal cost of raising public funds reduces the transfer or increases the tax.
All that matters is to introduce an eﬃciency loss to sidestep the unrealistic
optimum that all individuals choose specialized types of education. I choose
to let the cost reduce the transfer for transparency of the results.







where w(1 + g)(1 − t)k = A is the risky individual’s income if she succeeds,
w(1+g)(1−t)+T(1−λ) = C is the income if she fails and w(1+g)(1−t)k = B
is the income for the individuals with a broad education type. For an interior






where F is LHS-RHS in equation (3.8). Diﬀerentiating equation (3.8) with














Fx < 0 since the net utility of choosing a specialized education type decreases
with risk aversion. Fg and Ft have opposite signs. Assuming that an increase
in the growth rate does not beneﬁt the individuals with specialized education
more than those with a broad education, that is Fg ≤ 0, then ensures the
denominator to be negative. dt
dT > 0 for obvious reasons. Thus, x increases
in T as long as the transfer net of the marginal cost of raising public funds is
increasing in T. This condition can be written FT +Fλ
dλ
dT > 0 =⇒ dλ
dT < 1−λ
T .
This expression shows that there is an upper limit to how sensitive the
marginal cost of raising public funds can be to increases in the transfer.
Above this limit, the increase in the transfer is more than outweighed by the
increase in the marginal cost of raising public funds. In that case, increasing
the transfer will decrease x and hence, the number of specialized individuals.
154 Welfare
In this section, I assess under which circumstances government intervention
is Pareto improving. I also discuss the Pareto eﬃcient level of the transfer
and the social optimum. Before this is done, it is necessary to say something
about the framework for the assessment. Recall that ex ante the education,
individuals only diﬀer in their preference for risk. Ex post education, however,
there are three types of workers: workers with a broad education type, work-
ers with a specialized education type who choose a relevant specialization,
and workers with a specialized education type who choose a non-relevant spe-
cialization. It is obvious that individuals choosing the broad education type
ex ante and a specialized one ex post the policy change, that is the switchers,
may end up worse oﬀ if they happen to have chosen the wrong specialization.
The focus in this paper for the assessment of Pareto improvement, however,
is not the individuals’ realized utilities but their expected utilities ex ante the
realization of which specialization turns out to be fruitful in the labor market.
4.1 Pareto improvement
Since ﬁscal redistribution favors individuals with specialized education types,
assessing Pareto improvements comes down to ensuring that the individuals
with the broad education type beneﬁt from the introduction of the tax and
transfer scheme presented above. This will be the case if the positive growth
externality outweighs the negative eﬀect of taxation. This result is formally
presented in the following proposition. Note that the growth rate can be
expressed as a function of the transfer, by combining equations (3.6), (3.7)
and (3.9).
16Proposition 3
Government intervention is Pareto improving if
dg
dT
(1 − t) ≥
dt
dT
(1 + g) (4.1)
that is, when the growth externality outweighs the negative eﬀects of taxation.
Proof. The consumption for the individuals with broad education is c =
w(1 + g(T))(1 − t(T)). Calculating dc
dT ≥ 0 and rearranging yields equation
(4.1).￿
Equation (4.1) is very intuitive. The LHS is the positive eﬀect of the transfer,
that is, the increase in the growth rate. The RHS is the negative tax eﬀect
for the individuals. Obviously, the higher is the growth rate, the higher is
the possibility of government intervention being Pareto improving. It could
thus be interesting to disentangle the diﬀerent eﬀects of an increase in the
transfer on the growth rate. As explained above, using equations (3.6), (3.7)


















where the second equality comes from the fact that df M
dx = pdM
dx . From equa-
tion (4.2), it is clear that the growth increase is higher 1) the higher is the
probability that a specialized worker gets a good match in the labor market,
2) the higher is the eﬀect of good matches on growth, 3) the larger is the
number of students that switch from the broad education type to a special-
ized one for a given change in the cutoﬀ value of risk aversion and 4) the
larger the sensitivity of the cutoﬀ value to the change in the transfer.
174.2 Pareto eﬃciency and social optimum
If equation (4.1) is fulﬁlled when introducing the tax and transfer system,
that is evaluated at T = 0, it means that the individuals choosing the broad
education type would beneﬁt from an increase in the transfer. Consequently,
they will be better oﬀ by increasing the transfer up to the point where equa-
tion (4.1) holds with equality, that is T is such that dc
dT = 0. At this point,
the positive growth eﬀect of the transfer exactly cancels the negative eﬀect of
taxation. Call this level of the transfer T ∗
B. The optimal level of the transfer
for the specialists will be T ∗
S > T ∗
B, however. The reason for this is that not
only does the specialists beneﬁt from the increase in the growth rate but
they also get the direct eﬀect of the transfer. The Pareto eﬃcient alloca-
tions are thus ∀T ∈ [T ∗
B,T ∗
S], where T ∗
B = 0 if dc
dT T=0 ≤ 0 for the individuals
choosing the broad education type and T ∗
S = 0 if
dE(U(c))
dT T=0 ≤ 0 for the
specialized individuals. Naturally, the social optimum T ∗ will depend on the
utility weights put on the diﬀerent types of individuals, but is bounded by





dT T=0 > 0, that is, the individuals choosing the broad education type
beneﬁt from the introduction of the transfer. Then T ∗
B < T ∗
S, the social opti-
mum T ∗ ∈ [T ∗
B,T ∗
S] and ∀T ∈ [T ∗
B,T ∗
S] are Pareto eﬃcient allocations.
Proof. See the Appendix for the proof of T ∗
B < T ∗
S.
dV (B)
dT > 0 at
T ∈ [0,T ∗
B),
dV (B)
dT < 0 at T > T ∗
B,
dE(V (S)
dT > 0 at T ∈ [0,T ∗
S) and
dE(V (S))
dT < 0 at T > T ∗
S. Hence, ∀T ∈ [T ∗
B,T ∗
S] are Pareto eﬃcient allo-




The paper has introduced a new market failure in the decision on enroll-
ment in higher education. An uncertain labor market with a high speed of
sectoral transformation may make individuals insure themselves against an
uncertain labor market by choosing a broad education type. This may harm
the economy, however, if specialized workers are an important factor behind
innovations and other activities fostering economic growth. The government
can overcome this problem by introducing a tax and transfer scheme work-
ing as an insurance for individuals who choose a specialized education type
that turns out to be a waste. In this way, a specialized education type be-
comes more attractive and some individuals will switch from a broad to a
specialized education type. I assess under which condition this intervention
Pareto improves the economy. This will be the case as long as the switchers’
eﬀect on the growth rate is suﬃciently large to compensate the individuals
choosing the broad education type for their tax deduction.
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(1 − t) −
dt
dT





Note that without the term 1 − λ − T dλ
dT in equation (5.2), T ∗
B = T ∗
S. This
term is positive and represents the additional positive eﬀect of the transfer
that the specialized workers enjoy, that is, the direct eﬀect of the transfer.
That implies that the parentheses must be negative which, in turn, implies
that T ∗
B < T ∗
S.
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